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In this paper we try to estimate the impact of Structural Funds on the
growth rates of Objective 1 European regions during the two …rst Pro-
gramming periods (1989-2000). For that purpose, we develop a ”hybrid”
model of economic growth that partially endogenizes the rate of tech-
nical progress and we test its main implications following a panel data
approach. Our results suggest that Structural Funds have positively in-
‡uenced the growth process of Objective 1 regions although their impact
has been much stronger during the …rst Programming period than during
the second. The same quantitative di¤erence between the two Program-
ming periods appears on the estimated rates of ¯ ¡convergence and the
catching-up e¤ect.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The main purpose of European Cohesion policy is to decrease regional dispar-
ities within the European Union. In accordance with the Treaty, the Union
1works to ”promote harmonious development” and aims particularly to ”narrow
the gap between the development levels of the various regions”. This principle
implies that Objective 1 is the main priority and more than 2/3 of the budget
of the Structural Funds is allocated to helping areas lagging behind in their de-
velopment. These regions have a GDP per capita below 75% of the Community
average and share some identical economic indicators: low level of investment,
a higher than average unemployment rate, lack of services for businesses and
individuals and poor basic infrastructure, among others.
The Structural Funds do not constitute a single source of …nance within the
European Union budget. They have their own speci…c thematic area. The Euro-
pean Regional Development Fund (ERDF) …nances infrastructure, job-creating
investments, local development projects and aid for small …rms. The European
Social Fund (ESF) aims to prevent and combat unemployment as well as devel-
oping human resources and promoting integration into the labour market. The
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) supports rural
development and improvement of agricultural structures. Although all of them
work hand in hand to help the take o¤ of economic activities in these regions
by providing them with the basic infrastructure they lack, adapting and raising
the level of human resources and encouraging investments in businesses.
Thus far, Structural policies seem to have been designed on the basis of
three main assumptions: (i) there exits gaps among EU regions, (ii) Structural
policies are able to reduce those gaps, and (iii) regional growth and convergence
leads to cohesion. So, it is crucial to evaluate the impact of Structural Funds in
order to help the European Commission in the pursuit and planning of future
policy to maximize its impact on economic development. In view of the scarcity
of studies on this topic, we propose a theoretical model of economic growth as a
framework to evaluate empirically the impact of the Structural Funds programs
on the Objective 1 European regions growth and convergence processes.
The ”growth” approach is particularly appropriate to study the impact of
Structural Funds because the Funds Programs are designed to enhance the ac-
cumulation of production factors that a¤ect the growth rate of the recipient
2economies. From a theoretical perspective, growth models provide di¤erent in-
sights into the e¤ects of public assistance and infrastructures. In the context of
a neoclassical Solow growth model, regional funds would …nance a greater level
of physical capital, which would correspond to a higher steady state income.
However, due to the decreasing marginal product of capital, the investment
rate declines towards the steady state income where the stock of capital per
person is constant. In this way, a higher investment rate in poorer regions may
increase the convergence speed to rich regions, but only transitionally since it
not raises the growth rate in the long run (see for example Boscá, Doménech
and Taguas (1999)). On the opposite, endogenous growth theories grant public
policies an important role in the determination of growth rates in the long run.
For instance, Aschauer (1989) and Barro (1990) predict that if public expendi-
tures are considered an input in the production function, then policies …nancing
new public infrastructures should increase the marginal product of private capi-
tal, hence fostering the capital accumulation and growth. An application of this
approach to evaluate the impact of Structural Funds in some European Union
countries is contemplated in Pereira (1999). However, there is enough evidence
that an important fraction of observed productivity disparities across regions,
cannot be traced back to di¤erences in factor stocks, but in total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) di¤erentials. Henceforth, they play an important role to complete
the account of growth and explain the evolution of disparities across regions (or
countries). So, the dynamics of technical e¢ciency is a crucial issue that should
be explored within a suitable framework.
In this paper, we develop a ”structural hybrid” model of growth which ex-
tends the one commonly used in the literature by partially endogenizing the
rate of technical progress. Indeed, similar ”hybrid” models were used previ-
ously in the literature (see Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), de la Fuente (1995),
de la Fuente (2002) among others). In our model, we assume that techno-
logical progress in an economy evolves as a consequence of two complementary
forces:(i) the exogenous mechanism of technological di¤usion across countries or
regions, the so-called catch-up e¤ect, and (ii) an endogenous component coming
3from public policy. We consider that public expenses in activities that enhance
productivity are crucial determinants of the evolution of regional (or countries)
TFP levels. In particular, Structural Funds can enhance the TFP in several
fronts. The ERDF resources are mainly used to co…nance infrastructure and
productive investments leading to the creation or maintenance of jobs. In prac-
tise, all development areas are covered: transport, communication technologies,
energy, research and innovation, social infrastructure, training, etc. The ESF
promotes the return of the unemployed and the incorporation of disadvantaged
groups to the labour force, mainly by promoting equal opportunities in access-
ing the labour market, improving education and training systems, promoting a
skilled workforce, boosting human potential in the …eld of research and devel-
opment, etc. The EAGGF …nances rural development measures such as invest-
ments in agricultural holdings (modernization, reduction in production costs,
product quality, etc.), aids for the setting up of young farmers and vocational
training, processing and marketing of agricultural products, and development
of rural areas through the provision of services, encouragement for tourism, etc.
All these programs work together trying to provide a fertile ground for tech-
nological progress and, consequently for growth and development in European
regions.
To check the Cohesion Policy e¤ects, we test the equation derived from the
model that relates the rate of growth of income per capita with the initial level
of income per capita, the Structural Funds, the catching-up variable and the
initial level of TFP. The sample is composed by forty-one Objective 1 European
regions during the two …rst Programming periods of Structural Funds which
comprehends from 1989 to 2000. We estimate by OLS using a panel data ap-
proach, where the use of …xed e¤ects emerges endogenously from the structural
speci…cation of the model.
Proceeding in this way, the results of our estimation show a very weak e¤ect
of Structural Funds on the Objective 1 regions rates of income growth along
the period considered. However, the results are appreciably di¤erent when we
divide the sample in the two Programing periods. Our estimation results show
4that during the …rst Programming period, Structural Funds have had a clear
positive e¤ect in regions growth while their impact has been quite null during
the second Programming period. The same di¤erence between periods emerges
when we try to measure the presence of a catching-up e¤ect and the speed of
convergence among regions. Both phenomena are very signi…cant in the …rst
period but not in the second.
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows. Section 2 develops the
”hybrid” growth model that partially endogenizes the rate of technical progress.
Section 3 brie‡y describes the data set and introduces some descriptive informa-
tion. Section 4 o¤ers our main empirical results, and …nally Section 5 is devoted
to conclusions.
2 The model
In this section we develop a ”hybrid” model of economic growth. The term
hybrid is used in the sense that technological growth is happening as a conse-
quence of both, exogenous and endogenous forces. The endogenous component
comes from public expenses in activities that enhance productivity. In partic-
ular we are going to focus on the Structural Funds that the European Union
allocates to the less developed European Regions since the aim of Structural
Funds is to ameliorate their productive capacity. The exogenous component
is the catch-up e¤ect which implies that less developed economies can increase
their technology level faster than the more advanced, since it is easier to copy
existent technologies than to invent new ones.
Then, the model we will develop extend the one commonly used in the
literature in the following way.
Technology is given by a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function with
constant returns to scale.
Yt = K®
t (AtLt)1¡® = AtLtk®
t ; (1)
5where kt = Kt
AtLt is the capital /labour ratio in e¢ciency units of labour, Lt is
the labour force that grows at an exogenous and constant rate n; and At is a















is the catch-up factor, which measures the initial technological
distance between one region i and the leader l.
Substituting (3) into (2) we get the rate of technological progress as a func-











The household sector is the usual one in these models. The representative









K = Y ¡ LC ¡ ±K
where C is consumption per capita and the reminder parameters are the stan-
dard in the literature.
Solving this problem we obtain the dynamic system of the model which can





























¡ ± ¡ (n + g): (6)
6There, we can obtain the steady state values of capital and the rate of growth
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To explore the transitional dynamics we will use the saddle path solution of
the log-linearized system.
^ kt ¡ ^ k0 =( 1¡ e¡¯t)(^ k¤ ¡ ^ k0); (7)
or
^ yt ¡ ^ y0 =( 1¡ e¡¯t)(^ y¤ ¡ ^ y0); (8)
where ^ k =l nk and ^ y =l ny= ®^ k:










(^ y¤ ¡ ^ y0): (9)
Replacing ^ y0 =l n
Y0
L0























To make use of a panel data approach in our estimation, equation (10) must be






















7where lnAit =l nAi0 + git and s i sa… x e dn u m b e ro fy e a r s .
Using the Taylor’s Theorem and making some algebra, ^ y¤
i and gi may be
expressed in the following way:
^ y¤
i = ®^ k¤






¡ ®Bf(fi ¡ 1); (12)
and
gi = gl + gµ(µl;¿l;f l)(µi ¡ µl)+gf(µl;¿l;f l)(fi ¡ 1); (13)
where Bµ;B f;g µ and gf > 0.1
Finally, The equation we will estimate is obtained replacing into (11) the






















































uit is an error term.
This equation is an expression that relates the rate of per capita income
growth of each region with the received Structural Funds and the catch-up
variable, as well as the initial value of income per capita. It also appears in the
1See in the Appendix the corresponding expressions.
8equation the initial value of the TFP, Ai0; that is unobservable but it is constant
and speci…c for each regions. Then, in the estimation it will be captured by a
…xed e¤ect.
In the following sections we describe the data and the estimation results.
3D a t a d e s c r i p t i o n
Our sample is composed by regional data in EU15 including those regions elected
as Objective 1 during the two …rst Programming periods of European Struc-
tural Funds (1989-93 and 1994-99). We consider a total of forty-one European
Regions.2
We take the data of GDP per inhabitant in PPP units from the Eurostat
New Cronos Regio database. The amount of Structural Funds is taken from the
European Commission (1999) Six Periodic Report on the Social and Economic
situation of the regions of the Community. We use annual rates of growth of
GDP per capita from 1989 to 2000 and we build the catch-up variable as the
ratio between the GDP per capita of the European Union and each region at
the beginning of each sub-period. To measure the role of Structural Funds on
economic growth we consider three di¤erent variables:
(i) the total annual amount of Structural Funds divided by GDP,
(ii) the percentage of Funds each region receives respect to the received
Funds by all Objective 1 regions, and
(iii) the total annual amount of Funds.
2The sample is composed by the following NUTS 2 regions. For Belgium: Hainaut. For
Germany: Bradenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhaltz. Spain: Gali-
cia, Asturias, Cantabria, Castilla León, Castilla La Mancha, Extremadura, Comunidad Va-
lenciana, Andalucía, Murcia, Ceuta y Melilla, Canarias. For France: Corse, Goudaloupe,
Martinique, Frech Guiana, Reunion. For Italy: Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basili-
cata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna. For Netherland: Flevoland. For Portugal: Norte, Centro,
Lisboa e Vale do Tejo, Alentejo, Algarve, Açores, Madeira. For United Kingdon: Northern Ire-
land. Greece and Ireland are considered the entire county as regions because their Structural
Funds are not dissagregated by NUTS2 level.
9All the variables are measured at the beginning of each sub-period. For
these three measures we also take the Funds disaggregated in ESF, ERDF, and
EAGGF.
The main reason to test the model with three di¤erent measures of Struc-
tural Funds is to improve the robustness of the results. We use two ”relative”
measures: the ratio Funds/GDP, that is the most standard in the literature and
measures the weight of Funds with respect to the regions economic size, and
the proportion of the total Objective 1 Funds received by each region, which
measures the weight of the region in the Structural Funds budget. We also
use the ”absolute” value of Funds since it could capture an scale e¤ect of the
Funds. The size of funds could be relevant itself since we think that the invest-
ments with a stronger impact on growth will be probably largely costly, with
independence on the size of the region.3
We o¤er the variables notation we use in the square room below.
3We have also considered the ratio Funds/GDP per capita, since this variable could be
closer to the aim of the Structural Funds allocation in favour of backward regions according
to their GDP per capita levels. The empirical results are very similar to that obtained using
the variable Funds/GDP, so we do not report them to save space.
10Growth annual growth rate (%) of GDP per capita in PPP units
y0 logarithm of the initial value of GDP per capita in PPP units
catch catch-up variable
ESFGDP % of annualized ESF/GDP
ERDFGDP % of annualized ERDF/GDP
EAGFFGDP % of annualized EAGGF/GDP
FUDSGDP % of the sum of the three Funds/GDP
ESFEU % of the annualized ESF over the ESF received by all regions Objective 1
ERDFEU % of the annualized ERDF over the ERDF received by all regions Objective 1
EAGGFEU % of the annualized EAGGF over the EAGGF received by all regions Objective 1
FUNDSEU % of the sum of Funds over the sum of Funds received by all regions Objective 1
totalESF total annualized amount of ESF
totalERDF total annualized amount of ERDF
totalEAGGF total annualized amount of EAGGF
totalFUNDS t h es u mo ft h et r e ep r e v i o u sF u n d s
X:t variable X multiplied by the tendency
We make the exercise considering three di¤erent sub-samples corresponding
to three di¤erent periods. The …rst one takes the period 1989-2000. The second
and third are divisions of the whole sample period between the two Program-
ming periods. We do this distinction by two main reasons: (i) obviously, if the
Programs are di¤erent in the total amount of resources, their allocation among
regions, and in the period of time they are executed then, their e¤ects could
also be di¤erent, and (ii) there is the extended rumour among economists that
the European regions have su¤ered a slow down in their growth processes in the
second period, and the e¤ects of Funds could have been less fruitful. So, we will
check whether this expected di¤erence appears on data.
A preliminary view of the data shows that the location of Structural Funds
among European regions is inversely correlated with their starting GDP per
capita levels as we can see in Figures 1 and 2. Following the Cohesion Policy aim
of helping the more backward regions this is what we must expected. However,
11there is far from an evidence of a nearly proportionate relationship. Some
backward regions received amounts of structural funds per GDP similar to less
depressed regions.
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Figure 1: Relationship between the regional GDP per capita in 1988 and the
Structural Funds recieved in the First programming period.
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Figure 2: Relationship between the regional GDP per capita in 1993 and the
Structural Funds recieved in the Second Programming period.
The regression line slopes make evident that in the …rst Program of Struc-
12tural Funds the redistribution is smaller than in the second. Although the …nan-
cial redistribution through the Structural Funds has increased, it still remains
very imperfect. Obviously, other criteria di¤erent than per capita GDP are in-
cluded for determining this allocation, and institutions bargaining implying the
national, regional and community authorities surely play a decisive role.
Furthermore, Figure 3 shows that the regional dispersion of regional GDP
per capita respect to the EU15 has not decreased progressively during the whole
period. We observe that during the …rst Programming period, the standard
deviation of the distribution goes down from 1990, but during the second pro-
gramming period begins going up and recovers part of the initial gains. During
the last period of the sample, the tendency seems going to enlarge the disparity
of the deviations of regional GDP per capita respect to the EU15. This fact
could be in agreement with the extended idea of the downturn of European
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Figure 3: Standard deviation of the regional GDP per capita di¤erences respect to
the EU15
Next, we proceed to estimate of the equation (14) of our model and we
describe in the following section the empirical results we have obtained.
134 Estimation Results
To analyze the e¤ect of the Structural Funds of European Union on the rates
of growth in Objective 1 regions, we estimate equation (14) by OLS following a
panel data approach with …xed e¤ects, where the regional dummies capture the
value of Ai0, which is not observable but is …xed along the period and particular
for each region.
We should expect a positive impact of Structural Funds on the growth rates
since they are the basis of the EU Cohesion policy. In our equation , the
coe¢cient that tell us whether the impact on growth of Structural Funds is
positive or negative is '4 since the theoretical model predicts its sign. It includes
the funds variable multiplied by the tendency. Tables 1, 2 and 3 show the results
of the regressions for the total sample period that comprehends from 1989 to
2000. In Table 1 we observe that the variables of Funds/GDP are not signi…cant,
except the ERDF which is positive and signi…cant at 10% of probability. In
Table 2, we see that the variables of percentages respect to the total Objective
1 Funds are positive but not signi…cant. However in Table 3, the coe¢cients of
Total Funds and their amounts split into ESF, ERDF, EAGGF are positive and
signi…cant. 4 This di¤erence on signi…cativity among the three variables could
be caused by the high correlation between the initial income variable and the
”relative” measures of funds which biases their estimates.5 However the total
amount of funds is much less correlated and their coe¢cients are more e¢ciently
estimated.
Nevertheless, our theoretical model does not predict the sign of coe¢cient
'1; which includes the variable Funds without multiply by the tendency, since
is the sum of two opposite sign components. The positive contribution comes
from the expression of g¤
i and the negative from ^ y¤
i : In our estimations these
signs are negative for all Funds, which in terms of the model implies that the
4We include each fund separately in di¤erent regressions because they are very correlated
and introducing all together in the same regression causes a multicolinearity problem.
5Note that as we saw above, the allocation of Funds (%GDP) among regions is inversely
related to the initial value of their GDP per capita.
14impact of Funds is larger in the long run level of income, ^ y¤
i than in the long
r u nr a t eo fg r o w t h ,g¤
i :
On the other hand, to test if there is a catch-up phenomenon among Ob-
jective 1 regions, we have to look at coe¢cient '5, catch-up multiplied by the
tendency, because it measures the catching up e¤ect during the transition to
the steady state, when the catching up process is more relevant. We see that
it is positive and signi…cant in all regressions of Tables 1, 2 and 3. So, there
is a catching up process during this period. This implies that there is an ac-
tive mechanism of exogenous growth di¤erent from the neoclassical concept of
¯¡convergence, due to the existence of decreasing marginal returns on factors.6
Moreover, the initial income variable appears negative and signi…cant in all
regressions. This result implies that there also exits ¯ ¡ convergence during
the analyzed period.7 Tables 1, 2 and 3 report the estimations of the speed of
convergence, ^ ¯: They range from 28.11% to 31.39%, which implies that there is
a large tendency among European regions Objective 1 to converge to their re-
spective steady states (the so-called conditional convergence in the literature).
Furthermore, it is interesting to test whether all regions tend to a common
steady state (what is called absolute convergence).8 In Table 4 we present
the results of a simple exercise to estimate the speed of convergence. In the
a b o v es e c t i o no fT a b l e4w ei n t r o d u c eac o n s t a n tt e r ma sac o m m o ne l e m e n t
and no other variable that permits to distinguish among di¤erent steady states,
6The concep of ¯ ¡ convergence is linked to the neoclassical growth model which predicts
that the growth rate of a region is positively related to the distance that separates it from its
steady state.
7The variables of initial income and catch-up are very correlated by construction. Then, it
has not sense to introduce both in the same regression, since the estimation of their coe¢cients
w o u l db eb i a s e da sw ew i l ls e ei nT a b l e4 .
8The concep of conditional ¯ ¡convergence provide a measure of the speed at which each
region approaches its position in a stationary distribution characterized by regional inequality.
Note that if economies have very di¤erent steady states, this concept is compatible with a
persistent high degree of inequality among economies. However, absolute ¯¡convergence can
be interpreted as a summary indicator of the strength of the tendency towards the reduction
of inequalities.
15so the estimation of ¯ can be interpreted as an approximation to the speed of
absolute convergence. However, in the section below we introduce …xed e¤ects
by region. In this case, the estimated value for ¯ could be interpreted as an
approximation of the speed of conditional convergence since …xed e¤ects could
be capturing di¤erences in the regions steady states. Our results indicate that
absolute convergence exits along the period and it is around 9%, much smaller
that conditional convergence as we should expect. In the estimation results
with …xed e¤ects, when we introduce the variable catch:t the speed of conver-
gence (28.5%) is more than the double than without this variable (12.23%).9
Moreover, the variable catch:t is not signi…cant in the estimation without …xed
e¤ects. This result comes from the fact that the catch-up variable, by de…nition
is related to the state of each region, Ai0,.So, the absence of …xed e¤ects in our
estimations leads to a problem of omission of relevant variables which biases the
estimation of the initial income coe¢cient. This fact also explains the di¤er-
ences observed among the estimated values of ¯ and the lack of signi…cancy of
the catch:t variable in the regression with the constant term.
Regarding to the e¤ects of Structural Funds on the speed of convergence
we observe that the estimated values of ¯ reported in Tables 1, 2 and 3 do
not di¤er substantially from the 28.5 % obtained in the estimation with …xed
e¤ects. They are slightly higher. So, we infer that the convergence process
of Objective 1 regions does not seem to be greatly a¤ected by the impact of
Structural Funds.10
In a previous work by García-Solanes and María-Dolores (2002) they esti-
mate the absolute and conditional ¯¡convergence rate for the EU12 countries
over the period 1989-99 and the EU 12 regions over the period 1989-96, using
also a panel data approach with annual growth rates. They obtain that absolute
¯ ¡convergence is 8.6% among countries and 2.5% among regions.11 However,
9The previous convergence literature always predicts that the speed of convergence esti-
m a t e dw i t h… x e de ¤ e c t si sl a r g e rt h a nw i t h o u tt h e m .
10This weak impact of structural Funds on the converge rate of European regions is also
obtained by Dall´erba and Le Gallo (2003) using a spatial econometric analysis.
11Dall´rba and Le Gallo (2003) obtain a rate of absolute ¯ ¡ convergence of 1.98% for a
16conditional convergence rates enlarge to 16.91% for countries and 17.9% for re-
gions. Our results for Objective 1 regions are in the middle. Objective 1 regions
converge to the same steady state at an equal rate than countries, but converge
to their respective steady states slower than countries. To compare the behavior
of Objective 1 regions respect to the overall set of EU12 regions, we remake our
exercise for the period 1989-96 and we obtain that the absolute and conditional
convergence rates are 13.3% and 22.95% respectively. So, during this period.
Objective 1 regions converge among them much faster than the overall set of
EU12 regions do.
The results we have shown prove that the exogenous component of growth
that the model proposes is active in regions Objective 1 along the period 1989-
2000. However, the e¤ect of Structural Funds as an engine of growth has been
very weak in the light of our results. Due to the importance of Structural Funds
it is necessary to try to accurate more this result and to discern whether the poor
e¤ect of Structural Funds on growth is di¤erent between the two Programming
periods. Thus, we divide the whole sample period into the two sub-samples
corresponding to both Programing periods.
In Tables 5 and 6, we present the results of the estimation of equation (14)
for the sample data corresponding to the …rst Structural Funds Program.12 The
…rst di¤erence we observe respect to the previous results is that the adjusted
R-squared is larger, reaching values between 0.7 and 0.9 versus to the previous
range from 0.5 to 0.7. But a more important result is that all our measures
of Structural Funds are positive and signi…cant and the size of their coe¢cients
is larger than in the previous estimations. This means that e¤ectively, the …rst
Structural Funds Program (1989-1993) had a positive impact on the growth
rates of Regions Objective 1. It is also important to emphasize that during this
period, the rate of conditional ¯¡convergence has been much larger (see the
sample of 145 European regions during the period 1989-99 using a cross-section approach.
12The estimation results for the respective variables of Total Funds and the %Funds/UE are
the same because the %Funds/UE are a linear transformation of the Total Funds variables.
We only report the results corresponding to the %Funds/UE variables.
17reported values in Tables 5 and 6).
In Table 7, we remake the exercise of convergence for the …rst Program-
ming period. The results of the estimations with and without …xed e¤ects are
qualitatively equivalent to that obtained with the whole sample period. The
di¤erence is that the size of the estimated values of ¯ for the First Programing
period is much larger: The absolute ¯¡convergence rate is around 15%, and
the conditional ¯¡convergence rate increases to 28.42%, and 46.13% when the
variable catch:t is introduced into the regression.
Therefore, we observe that the most important results are quantitatively
di¤erent during the …rst Programming period of Structural Funds. Next, we
proceed to estimate equation (14) for the sub-sample corresponding to the sec-
ond Programing period. Tables 8 and 9 show the results. As we expected,
they are worse than the former. The adjusted R-squared are very low, between
0.03 and 0.05. This means that the independent variables have a very small
explanatory power of the growth rate of regions Objective 1 during this second
period. On the one hand, the Structural Funds variables are positive but not
signi…cant at all or even negative. On the other hand, the exogenous forces of
growth are much less active: the catch:t variable is positive and the coe¢cient
of y0 is negative but not always signi…cant.13 We present the results of this
convergence exercise in Table 10. Notice that in this second period absolute
¯¡convergence does not exist. Moreover, the variable y0 is marginally signi…-
cant on the estimation with …xed e¤ects and the estimated speed of convergence
is much smaller, 3.75%. Only when the variable catch:t is introduced into the
regression, the variable y0 becomes signi…cant and the estimated ¯ enlarges to
9.48%.
As we just saw, our results in terms of the impact on growth of Structural
Funds and the convergence rate are very di¤erent on the two sub-sample periods.
The …rst Structural Funds Program had a clear positive impact on the growth
13The variable catch::t is positive and signi…cant and the initial income variable is negative
and also signi…cant in all the estimations with the Funds/GDP per capita variables. The
estimated value of ¯ is around the 15%. They are not o¤ered to sace espace.
18rates of European regions Objective 1, but the second Program did not have
the same impact. There, we can say that the weak e¤ect of Structural Funds
observed on the estimations over the whole sample period is explained by the
null or even negative e¤ect they have had on the growth rates of Objective 1
regions during the second Programming period. It is also important to note
that our bad results for the second sub-sample might be leaded in part by worse
data quality, since the last two observations contains projections of the regions
GDP per capita instead of the authentic values. Then, there may be a measure
errors problem biasing the coe¢cients estimates.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The European Union´s Structural Funds are intended to help increase economic
and social cohesion between Member States, and constitute an important instru-
ment for reducing regional imbalances and di¤erences in economic development.
The Funds´s contributions have grown from 8 billion euros per year in 1989 to
32 billions euros per year in 1999. The EU continues to give a high priority
to regional and structural policies for the period 2000-2006 and has allocated
a total of 195 billions euros to be placed at the disposal of Structural Funds,
a …gure that accounts for approximately one third of total EU budget. Some
…fty regions Objective 1, home to 27% of the European population, will receive
135,90 billions euros, more than two thirds of the appropriations of the Struc-
tural Funds with the aim that the Structural Funds will support the take o¤ of
economic activities in these regions by providing them with the basic infrastruc-
ture they lack, whilst adapting and raising the level of trained human resources
and encouraging investments in businesses.
However, in the light of our results it is far from clear that the Structural
Funds will manage this objective. We just saw that the Structural Funds had a
signi…cant impact on the rates of growth of the regions Objective 1 during the
…rst Programming period, but we can not say the same for the second Program.
Although data are worse for the last period, the results are bad enough to
19believe that the growth and convergence processes in regions Objective 1 are
downwards and the positive e¤ects of Structural Funds could have disappeared.
Since the resources devoted to the Structural Funds constitute a very im-
portant part of the EU budget, and Objective 1 is the main priority of the
European Unions´s Cohesion policy, it is necessary to closely follow the impact
of Structural Funds on the trajectory of growth and convergence processes in
Regions Objective 1, with more and better data. It is equally important to
analyze these e¤ects under the adequate theoretical framework. Far from been
the only one, in this paper we have proposed a reasonable ”hybrid” model of
economic growth, which permits to interpret the estimated coe¢cients and then
to analyze the e¤ects on growth of the Structural Funds, as well as to distin-
guish between the trend to convergence (what is called ¯ ¡ convergence) and
catching-up e¤ect that are also in‡uencing the growth rates of the regions.
Thus, our empirical evidence on the positive impact of the Structural Funds
Programs (during 1989-93 and 1994-99 periods) on the Objective 1 regions rates
of growth and speed of convergence is quite mixed, in spite of policymakers
generally show excessive optimism in their evaluations. We believe, however,
that our empirical results invite to re‡ect about issues as the design of Structural
Funds, their allocation, and their ability to reduce gaps among regions within
the European Union.
The EU enlargement process to Eastern countries will channel a big share
of the Structural Funds budget to these countries with the aim that they con-
tribute to higher economic growth and development. Whatever way, the expe-
rience from the two previous Programs of Structural Funds within the current
European regions suggest that placing too high expectations on the ability of
structural funds to reduce regional disparities could be misplaced.
20TABLE 1

































^ ¯ 30.73% 29.88% 31.39% 31.56%
¹ R2 0.68077 0.76766 0.68406 0.67177
Temporal dummies are included in all regressions.
t- statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent.
Sample period: 1989-2000. Dependent variable: Growth
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FUNDSEU:t 5:62E ¡ 05
0:33
ESFEU:t 1:95E ¡ 05
0:09












^ ¯ 29.6% 29.03% 29.86% 30.06%
¹ R2 0.47399 0.48142 0.47243 0.46495
Temporal dummies are included in all regressions.
t- statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent.
Sample period: 1989-2000. Dependent variable: Growth
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totalFUNDS:t 8:3E ¡ 06
3:72
totalESF:t 3:04E ¡ 05
4:03
totalERDF:t 1:35E ¡ 05
2:74










^ ¯ 28.53% 26.86% 29.1% 28.11%
¹ R2 0.48397 0.50249 0.47207 0.47703
Temporal dummies are included in all regressions.
t- statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent.























^ ¯ 8.5713.3% 9.27%
¹ R2 0.18629 0.22981 0.22896 0.18778













^ ¯ 12.23% 28.5%
¹ R2 0.27582 0.48992 0.48769 0.43768
t- statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent.
Sample period: 1989-2000. Dependent variable: Growth
24TABLE 5

































^ ¯ 33.72% 32.58% 34.01% 36.89%
¹ R2 0.9026 0.9029 0.9021 0.9043
Temporal dummies are included in all regressions.
t- statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent.
First Programming period. Dependent variable: Growth
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^ ¯ 47.4% 48.1% 47% 47.4%
¹ R2 0.7094 0.7115 0.7073 0.7043
Temporal dummies are included in all regressions.
t- statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent.























^ ¯ 15.27% 15.08%
¹ R2 0.2653 0.2965 0.2908 0.2619













^ ¯ 28.42% 46.13%
¹ R2 0.632 0.6454 0.6599 0.63923
t- statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent.
First Programming period. Dependent variable: Growth
27TABLE 8
































^ ¯ 4.31% 5.03% 4.42% 4.97%
¹ R2 0.0621 0.034 0.0588 0.0352
Temporal dummies are included in all regressions.
t- statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent.
Second Programming period. Dependent variable: Growth
28TABLE 9

































^ ¯ 8.65% 9.15% 8.47% 9.53%
¹ R2 0.0514 0.0531 0.0519 0.0551
Temporal dummies are included in all regressions.
t- statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent.





















catch:t ¡3:66E ¡ 05
¡0:05
^ ¯ 1.6% 1.6%
¹ R2 0.0027 0.0057 -0.0025 -0.0056













^ ¯ 3.75% 9.48%
¹ R2 0.0611 0.135 0.1272 0.0857
t- statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent.
Second Programming period. Dependent variable: Growth
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33APPENDIX.
We present below the algebraic derivation of the model.









K = Y ¡ LC ¡ ±K






K®(AL)1¡® ¡ LC ¡ ±K
¢
:
Solving the corresponding FOC, we obtain the standard equation for the evolu-









t ¡ ½ ¡ ±
¢
:
To explore the system’s transitional dynamics, we begin by log-linearizing













^ k®° ´ F(^ c;^ k;µ;f0); (1)
¢
^ k = e




^ k®° ´ G(^ c;^ k;µ;f0): (2)
Equalling both equations to zero and solving the system, we observe that the
steady state is a saddle point and the stable root corresponds to the negative
eigenvalue. Since the equilibrium trajectory of the model corresponds to the
saddle path of the system, the speed of convergence toward the steady state will
be determined by this negative eigenvalue. Let us denote by ¯ the convergence
coefficient. We will use the saddle path solution of the log-linearized system
as an approximation to the equilibrium trajectory of the original system. Thus,
the equilibrium path of ^ k is given by
34^ kt ¡ ^ k0 =( 1¡ e¡¯t)(^ k¤ ¡ ^ k0): (3)
De…ning ^ y =l ny,w eh a v et h a t^ y = ®^ k and (3) becomes
^ yt ¡ ^ y0 =( 1¡ e¡¯t)(^ y¤ ¡ ^ y0):









(^ y¤ ¡ ^ y0): (4)
Replacing ^ y0 by ln Y0
L0 ¡ lnA0; and inserting regions sub-indexes, equation (4)






















Notice that in principle initial technology levels, technical progress rates, con-
vergence coe¢cients and steady state ^ y levels ccould di¤er across countries. To
specify these di¤erences across countries let´s go back to the model.
We start writing equations (1) and (2) in a more compact way,
_ w = Á(w;»); where w =( ^ c;^ k) and » =( µ;f0):
By using the Taylor’s Theorem, we approximate Á(w;») around the point (wl;»l),
where »l corresponds to the parameter vector of a leader region and wl is its
steady state value of (^ c;^ k),
_ w = Á(w;») ' _ w = Á(wl;»l)+Áw(wl;»l)(w ¡ wl)+Á»(wl;»l); (6)
35where Á(wl;»l)=0 ;Á w(wl;»l) is the Jacobian matrix and Á»(wl;»l) is the ma-
trix of partial derivatives with respect to the policy parameters, both evaluated
at the leader region.
Setting Á(w;»)=0i n( 6 ) ,w ec a no b t a i na na p p r o x i m a t i o no ft h es t e a d y
state value for a given », w¤(»): Then,
_ w =0 ) Áw(wl;»l)(w¤ ¡ wl)+Á»(wl;»l)(» ¡ »l)=0 ; that is
w¤ ' wl ¡ [Áw(wl;»l)]





4 F^ c F^ k
















































Isolating ^ k¤; it can be expressed as






¡ Bf(f ¡ 1);
where fl =1and Bµ;B f > 0:14 Therefore,
^ y¤
i = ®^ k¤






¡ ®Bf(fi ¡ 1): (7)
Once ^ y¤
i di¤ers across regions depending on policy parameters, we turn back
to (6) and rewrite it in terms of deviations of w from its own steady state,
(w ¡ w¤) ' Áw(wl;»l)(w ¡ w¤ + w¤ ¡ wl)+Á»(wl;»l)(» ¡ »l)
' Áw(wl;»l)(w ¡ w¤)+( 0 ) :




















36Notice that this system has the same coe¢cient matrix Áw(wl;»l) for all regions
and therefore the same eigenvalues. Hence, as a …rst approximation, we can
take the same value of ¯ for all countries.
Finally, we can also rewrite the long run growth rate, g; a saf u n c t i o no ft h e
policy parameters in deviations to the leader, taking logarithms in equation (4)
of the main text and using a linear approximation around gl = g(µl;¿l;f l);






gf = gl(1 ¡ ° ¡ °®Bf):
Now, we can rewrite the growth rate of income per capita in terms of policy
variables and the catch-up factor, just substituting expressions (7) and (8) in
equation (5).
15Taking logarithms in equation (4), we have that: lng¤ = ° lnµ+(1¡°)lnf0 +®° lnk¤ =
° lnµ +( 1¡ °)lnf0 + °^ y¤ =
=° lnµ +( 1¡ °)lnf0 + °
³





¡ ®Bf(fi ¡ 1)
´
Taking derivatives in ths espression, we obtain the values of gµ and gf:
37